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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
 For this installment of the Recent Developments, we examine one 
recent United States Supreme Court decision, two cases recently ar-
gued before the U.S. Supreme Court, and two recent U.S. Courts of 
Appeals decisions. Note One examines Philip Morris USA v. Wil-
liams,1 where the U.S. Supreme Court examined the propriety of a 
punitive damages award in tobacco litigation where the award con-
sidered harm to nonlitigant third parties.2 Note Two examines Hein
v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc.,3 a taxpayer standing case 
recently argued before the U.S. Supreme Court.4 Note Three exam-
ines Frederick v. Morse,5 another recently argued case, which in-
volves high school students’ First Amendment rights.6 Note Four ex-
amines Leonard v Robinson,7 a Sixth Circuit decision discussing the 
First Amendment right not to be arrested for speaking angrily at a 
town meeting.8 Finally, Note Five examines Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 
(Hamdan 2),9 where the D.C. Circuit Court continued the conten-
tious litigation between Hamdan and the U.S. government.10
                                                                                                                   
 1. 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007). 
 2. Andrew Collinson contributed this Note. 
 3. 127 S. Ct. 722 (2006).
 4. Stephanie Tañada contributed this Note.
 5. 439 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 6. Jeremy W. Harris contributed this Note. 
 7. 477 F.3d 347(6th Cir. 2007). 
 8. Noah Nadler contributed this Note. 
 9. 464 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 2006). 
 10. Brian Sites contributed this Note. 
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TORT LAW—PUNITIVE DAMAGES—A PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARD 
BASED ON A JURY’S DESIRE TO PUNISH A DEFENDANT FOR HARMING 
NONPARTIES AMOUNTS TO A TAKING OF PROPERTY FROM THE 
DEFENDANT WITHOUT DUE PROCESS—Philip Morris USA v. Wil-
liams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007). 
 In a state negligence and deceit lawsuit, an Oregon jury found 
that Jesse Williams’ death was caused by smoking and that peti-
tioner Philip Morris, the manufacturer of the cigarettes Williams 
smoked, knowingly and falsely led him to believe that smoking was 
safe.11 During the trial the jury was asked to consider how many 
other people had been deceived by Philip Morris in the State of Ore-
gon over the past forty years.12 As a result, the jury awarded Wil-
liams’ estate $821,000 in compensatory damages and $79.5 million in 
punitive damages.13 On appeal by Philip Morris, the United States 
Supreme Court vacated the ruling by the Oregon Supreme Court, 
holding that the Due Process Clause forbids a jury from basing a pu-
nitive damages award upon its desire to punish the defendant for 
harming persons who are not a party to the lawsuit.14 The Court held 
that such punitive damages amount to a taking of property from the 
defendant without due process.15
 This lawsuit arose out of the death of Jesse Williams, a heavy 
cigarette smoker.16 Respondent, Williams’ widow, represented his es-
tate in this state lawsuit for negligence and deceit against Philip 
Morris, the manufacturer of the cigarettes that Williams had pre-
ferred.17 An Oregon jury found that Williams’ death had been caused 
by smoking, that Williams had smoked because he had thought it 
safe to do so, and that Philip Morris knowingly and falsely encour-
aged Williams to believe in the safety of its product.18 The jury fur-
ther found that Philip Morris was negligent and had engaged in de-
ceit.19 As a result of this finding, the jury awarded punitive damages 
in a nearly 100 to 1 ratio to compensatory damages.20
 The trial judge, citing BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,21
found the punitive damages to be excessive and reduced the award to 
$32 million.22 Both sides appealed the ruling, and the Oregon Court 
 11. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1060-61 (2007). 
 12. Id. at 1061. 
 13. Id.
 14. Id. at 1060. 
 15. Id.
 16. Id.
 17. Id. at 1060-61. 
 18. Id. at 1061. 
 19. Id.
 20. Id.
 21. 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
 22. Williams, 127 S. Ct. at 1061. 
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of Appeals rejected Philip Morris’ arguments and restored the jury 
award to $79.5 million.23 Philip Morris immediately appealed to the 
Oregon Supreme Court, which denied review; the company then peti-
tioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was 
granted.24 In light of its decision in State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co. v. Campbell,25 the Court remanded the case.26
 On review in the Oregon Supreme Court, Philip Morris argued 
that the trial court should have read a proposed punitive damages 
instruction to the jury specifically instructing the jury that it could 
not seek to punish Philip Morris for injury to persons not party to the 
lawsuit.27 In refusing to give such an instruction to the jury, Philip 
Morris argued that there was a “significant likelihood” that a portion 
of the $79.5 million award represented punishment for harming oth-
ers in addition to Williams and that this was forbidden by the Due 
Process Clause.28 The Oregon Supreme Court rejected Philip Morris’ 
arguments, finding that the Constitution does not prohibit a state 
jury from “using punitive damages to punish a defendant for harm to 
nonparties.”29 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to Philip 
Morris to consider whether Oregon had unconstitutionally permitted 
Philip Morris to be punished for harming nonparty victims.30
 Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer ruled, “[T]he Constitu-
tion’s Due Process Clause forbids a State to use a punitive damages 
award to punish a defendant for injury that it inflicts upon nonpar-
ties or those whom they directly represent, i.e., injury that it inflicts 
upon those who are, essentially, strangers to the litigation.”31 The 
reasoning for this stems from the Due Process prohibition against 
punishing an individual without first providing the individual with 
“an opportunity to present every available defense.”32 To Breyer, per-
mitting punishment for injury to nonparty victims allows the defendant 
 23. Id.
 24. Id.
 25. 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
 26. Williams, 127 S. Ct. at 1061. 
 27. Id.
 28. Id.
 29. Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 127 P.3d 1165, 1175 (2006). 
 30. Williams, 127 S. Ct. at 1062. Philip Morris had further argued that the punitive 
damages award was “grossly excessive” in light of BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 
U.S. 559, 574-75 (1996), and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Campbell, 538 
U.S. 408, 416-17 (2003). While the Supreme Court also granted certiorari on the question 
of whether Oregon had disregarded “the constitutional requirement that punitive damages 
be reasonably related to the plaintiff’s harm,” the Court ended up considering only whether 
the punishment for harm to nonparty victims was constitutional, as remand of this case 
could lead to a new trial or change in the amount of punitive damages awarded. Williams,
127 S. Ct. at 1061-62, 1065. 
 31. Williams, 127 S. Ct. at 1063. 
 32. Id. (quoting Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 66 (1972)). 
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no opportunity to defend against the charge by showing how other vic-
tims were not entitled to damages because of their own negligence.33
 Of additional concern to the Court was that permitting punish-
ment for the injury of nonparty victims “would add a near standard-
less dimension to the punitive damages equation.”34 The questions of 
how many victims, the seriousness of injury, and the circumstances 
of each victim’s injury would not likely be answered during a trial, 
leaving the jury to speculate as to appropriate damages.35 Thus, 
wrote Breyer, “the fundamental due process concerns to which our 
punitive damages cases refer—risks of arbitrariness, uncertainty and 
lack of notice—will be magnified.”36
 While punitive damages may not be awarded for injury to nonpar-
ties, the majority made clear that the Due Process Clause does not 
preclude evidence of harm to nonparties from being introduced for 
the purpose of demonstrating reprehensibility.37 According to Justice 
Breyer, “[e]vidence of actual harm to nonparties can help to show 
that the conduct that harmed the plaintiff also posed a substantial 
risk of harm to the general public, and so was particularly reprehen-
sible . . . .”38 However, such evidence is to be used in determining 
whether an award is ultimately justified or excessive and may not be 
used by the jury to punish a defendant for harm alleged to have been 
inflicted on nonparties.39 Thus, the majority wrote, “the Due Process 
Clause requires States to provide assurance that juries are not ask-
ing the wrong question, i.e., seeking, not simply to determine repre-
hensibility, but also to punish for harm caused strangers.”40
 The error in the Oregon Supreme Court’s opinion, the majority 
held, was that it focused on more than reprehensibility in upholding 
the punitive damages award.41 In rejecting Philip Morris’ claim that 
the Constitution forbids the use of punitive damages to punish a de-
fendant for harm to nonparties, the Oregon court made three state-
ments.42 The majority found that the first statement—that the Court 
in State Farm had held only that a jury could not base an award on 
dissimilar acts of a defendant—was correct, but held that a jury may 
 33. Id.
 34. Id.
 35. Id.
 36. Id. (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996); State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003)). 
 37. Id. at 1064. 
 38. Id.
 39. Id. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 574-75 (excessiveness decision depends upon the repre-
hensibility of the defendant’s conduct, whether the award bears a reasonable relationship 
to the actual and potential harm caused by the defendant to the plaintiff, and the differ-
ence between the award and sanctions “authorized or imposed in comparable cases”). 
 40. Williams, 127 S. Ct. at 1064. 
 41. Id.
 42. Id. at 1064-65. 
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not punish for harm to others.43 The majority disagreed with the sec-
ond statement—that if a jury cannot punish for the conduct, there is 
no reason to consider it—because while the Due Process Clause pro-
hibits punishment for harm to nonparties, it permits a jury to con-
sider such harm in determining reprehensibility. The third state-
ment—that it is difficult to see how a jury could consider harm to 
nonparties without using that consideration in determining punish-
ment—raises the practical problem of knowing what the jury was 
thinking when it imposed its punishment.44 The answer the majority 
endorsed is that “state courts cannot authorize procedures that cre-
ate an unreasonable and unnecessary risk of any such confusion oc-
curring.”45 Although States have some flexibility in determining 
what kind of procedures to implement in protecting against the 
risk of confusion, “federal constitutional law obligates them to 
provide some form of protection” where the “risk of . . . misunder-
standing is a significant one.”46
 The principle dissent by Justice Ginsburg criticized the majority’s 
approach, finding that it unnecessarily vacated the judgment of the 
Oregon Supreme Court, which had “deprive[d] [no jury] of proper le-
gal guidance” and had “endeavored to follow our decisions.”47 Gins-
burg expressed her belief that the Court had identified no charge by 
the Oregon courts inconsistent with the allowable scope of reprehen-
sibility in determining punitive damages and thus should not have 
overturned the Oregon ruling.48 Furthermore, Ginsburg argued, in 
making its decision, “the Court reaches outside the bounds of the 
case as postured when the trial court entered its judgment.”49 Ac-
cordingly, Ginsburg wrote, “I would accord more respectful treatment 
to the proceedings and dispositions of state courts that sought dili-
gently to adhere to our changing, less than crystalline precedent.”50
 While joining Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, Justice Thomas wrote a 
one-paragraph dissent separately to emphasize his view that “the 
Constitution does not constrain the size of punitive damages 
awards.”51 To Thomas, it did not matter that the Court called the rul-
ing “procedural,” as “the ‘procedural’ rule is simply a confusing im-
 43. Id. at 1065. 
 44. Id.
 45. Id.
 46. Id.
 47. Id. at 1068 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 48. Id.
 49. Id. at 1069. 
 50. Id.
 51. Id. at 1067 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Camp-
bell, 538 U.S. 408, 429-30 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting)). 
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plementation of the substantive due process regime this Court has 
created for punitive damages.”52
 In a separate dissent, Justice Stevens wrote that he saw “no rea-
son why” the harm of persons not before the court “should not be 
taken into consideration when assessing the appropriate sanction for 
reprehensible conduct.”53 To Stevens, “punitive damages are a sanc-
tion for the public harm the defendant’s conduct has caused or 
threatened.” In Stevens’ view, “[t]here is little difference between the 
justification for a criminal sanction, such as a fine or term of impris-
onment, and an award of punitive damages.”54
 Justice Stevens pointed to the difference between compensatory 
and punitive damages when dealing with third parties.55 He noted 
that in this case no party argued for punitive damages to be used to 
compensate nonparty victims.56 If this had happened, “[t]o award 
compensatory damages to remedy such third-party harm might well 
constitute a taking of property from the defendant without due proc-
ess.”57 Instead of serving a compensatory purpose in this case, how-
ever, the punitive damages award “serves the entirely different pur-
poses of retribution and deterrence that underlie every criminal 
sanction.”58 To Stevens, this retributive purpose behind punitive 
damages was even more important in this case because under Ore-
gon law the award was payable in part to the State rather than to 
the private litigant.59
 Justice Stevens took further issue with the majority’s distinction 
between taking nonparty harm into account in order to assess repre-
hensibility—which is permitted—from taking nonparty harm into ac-
count in order to punish the defendant directly—which is forbidden.60
To Stevens, “[w]hen a jury increases a punitive damages award be-
cause injuries to third parties enhanced the reprehensibility of the 
defendant’s conduct, the jury is by definition punishing the defen-
dant—directly—for third-party harm.”61
 Despite the vocal dissents to this opinion, the majority spent little 
time addressing the dissenters’ concerns. In the end, as the Oregon 
Supreme Court had applied the wrong constitutional standard when 
 52. Id.
 53. Id. at 1066 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 54. Id.
 55. Id.
 56. Id.
 57. Id.
 58. Id.
 59. Id.
 60. Id. at 1066-67. 
 61. Id. at 1067. 
2007]                          RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 1277 
                                                                                                                   
considering Philip Morris’ appeal, the case was remanded for appli-
cation of the correct standard set forth in the majority opinion.62
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—STANDING—UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
TO DECIDE IF TAXPAYERS MAY CHALLENGE GOVERNMENT ACTION 
VIOLATING THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE WHEN ACTION IS FINANCED 
BY UNEARMARKED TAXPAYER FUNDS—Hein v. Freedom from Religion 
Foundation, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 722 (2006) 
 The United States Supreme Court recently granted a writ of cer-
tiorari in the case of Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, 
Inc.63 The Court heard oral argument on February 28, 2007, and will 
soon determine whether taxpayers have standing under Article III of 
the Constitution to challenge government action that possibly vio-
lates the First Amendment’s establishment clause when the conduct 
was financed by taxpayer money not specifically earmarked for the 
challenged action.64
 In 2004, three members of the Freedom from Religion Foundation 
filed a complaint in the United States District Court, Western Dis-
trict of Wisconsin, against Jim Towey, the director of White House 
Faith-Based and Community Initiatives (FBCI), as well as other di-
rectors of such offices spread throughout several federal agencies.65
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’ actions violated the prin-
ciple of separation of church and state by using taxpayer money to 
fund activities that promote religion, specifically conferences where 
“faith-based organizations are singled out as particularly worthy of 
federal funding because of their religious orientation.”66
 The conferences took place after President Bush’s formation of 
FBCI, which was created through several executive orders.67 The 
Presidential orders provided for an official office for FBCI in the 
White House as well as for centers within several federal depart-
ments.68 Various executive branch agencies had held the challenged 
conferences to promote FBCI.69 However, the goal of these confer-
ences was “to promote community organizations whether secular or 
religious.”70 The White House established the conferences to 
 62. Id. at 1065 (majority opinion). 
 63. 127 S. Ct. 722 (2006).
 64. 433 F.3d 989, 990 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 65. Complaint at 1, Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 433 F.3d 989 (7th 
Cir. 2006), available at http://ffrf.org/legal/faithbased_complaint.pdf.   
 66. Id. at 4, 5. 
 67. Freedom from Religion Found., 433 F.3d at 993. 
 68. Id.
 69. Id.
 70. Id.
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provide participants with information about the Federal 
funding process, available funding opportunities, and the re-
quirements that come with the receipt of Federal funds . . . 
[and] also provide an opportunity to inform State and local 
officials about equal treatment regulations and other central 
elements of the Faith-Based and Community Initiative.71
After the plaintiffs alleged that the conferences were merely designed 
to promote religious organizations over the secular organizations, the 
trial court held that the plaintiffs did not have standing to sue.  
 However, in a 2-1 opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit reversed the trial court’s decision and ultimately 
held that the taxpayers did have standing.72 The plaintiffs alleged 
that the conferences were funded by the government and therefore 
based on an exercise of the Taxing and Spending Clause in addition 
to the Establishment Clause, thus giving them standing as taxpay-
ers.73 The Government argued that the funding for the conferences 
was provided by the President generally for the operation of his ex-
ecutive office and not directly by Congress; in reality, the objection 
was to the President using the funds for these conferences and not to 
Congress’s spending.74
 Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit, first delved into the 
history of judicial limitation in the Cases and Controversies Clause of 
Article III.75 He examined Justice Frankfurter’s concurring opinion 
in Coleman v. Miller, which stated that the framers of Article III 
wanted courts to look at problems “only if a concrete, living contest 
between adversaries called for the arbitrament of law” and limited 
federal jurisdiction to “cases in which the plaintiff alleged the kind of 
injury that would have supported a lawsuit in the eighteenth cen-
tury.”76 Future cases placed taxpayer standing outside the reach of 
Article III because this would not have satisfied standing require-
ments in the eighteenth century.77
 However, Judge Posner stated, the concept of standing has 
changed.78 U.S. Supreme Court cases from the 1990s upheld stand-
ing for a variety of reasons primarily centered on voter status, such 
as the standing to sue for lists of political action committee donors 
and standing for voters challenging new congressional districts as 
 71. Id. (citing White House Conferences on Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, 
http://www.dtiassociates.com/fbci/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2007).  
 72. Id. at 997.
 73. Id. at 998.
 74. Id.
 75. Id. at 990. 
 76. Id. (citing Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939) (concurring opinion)).  
 77. Id.
 78. Id.
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gerrymandering.79 One recent case “assumed (without discussion)” 
that the plaintiffs as voters and taxpayers had standing to dispute an 
amendment that limited certain candidates on a ballot.80
 Judge Posner then went into general standing specifically for Es-
tablishment Clause cases.81 He looked at American Civil Liberties 
Union v. City of St. Charles82 and Abington School District v. 
Schempp83 to determine how minimal standing requirements actu-
ally were for the Establishment Clause.84 In St. Charles, taxpayers 
brought suit to object to a cross on public property during Christmas-
time; the plaintiffs claimed they had to detour to avoid seeing the 
cross.85 The court held that detouring or “curtail[ing] of their use of 
the public rights of way” was injurious enough for standing.86 In 
Schempp, parents complained that having their children read the Bi-
ble and recite the Lord’s Prayer in public schools violated the Estab-
lishment Clause.87 The Schempp Court noted that the actual injury 
could have been avoided by taking their children out of that specific 
public school.88 But, Judge Posner noted, the plaintiffs in both cases 
still had standing to sue under the Establishment Clause, even with 
options of avoiding the injury.89
 Judge Posner then discussed Flast v. Cohen,90 a taxpayer chal-
lenge under the Establishment Clause.91 In Flast, the plaintiffs com-
plained that federal grant money had funded parochial schools, vio-
lating the Establishment Clause.92 The Flast Court determined 
standing on “prudential” principles instead of the actual injury to a 
taxpayer from having his or her taxes used for an offensive pur-
pose.93 Prudential principals, a judge-made doctrine, “deny stand-
ing to someone who has been injured as a result of the defendant’s 
conduct . . . but who is not the ‘right’ person to bring suit, maybe be-
cause someone has been injured more seriously and should be al-
lowed to control the litigation.”94 Because prudential principles of 
standing are common law, they are still subject to change.95 In Flast,
 79. Id.
 80. Id. at 990-91.  
 81. Id. at 991. 
 82. 794 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1986).  
 83. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).  
 84. Freedom from Religion Found., 433 F.3d at 991. 
 85. Id. (citing St. Charles, 794 F.2d at 268). 
 86. Id.
 87. Id. at 990 (citing Schempp, 374 U.S. 203).  
 88. Id.
 89. Id. at 991. 
 90. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).  
 91. Freedom from Religion Found., 433 F.3d at 991. 
 92. Id.
 93. Id.
 94. Id.
 95. Id. at 992.
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the Court created a two-part test and stated that plaintiffs can chal-
lenge congressional exercises of taxing and spending power as long 
as the expenditures are not “incidental” and the challenged exercise 
goes beyond specific and not general constitutional limitations96—
“specific” because the Establishment Clause has a “specific” limita-
tion on congressional expenditures for funding religion.97
 Judge Posner then discussed and compared Bowen v. Kendrick98
and ultimately decided Freedom from Religion Foundation would be 
governed by Bowen.99 In Bowen, the Court held that taxpayers did 
have standing to attack the Adolescent Family Life Act, even though 
grants had not been made by Congress itself.100 The Adolescent Fam-
ily Life Act was a congressional spending program administered by 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services.101 Bowen gave taxpay-
ers standing even if a violation was not complete until the executive 
branch acted.102 A taxpayer had to show only that a statute was en-
acted “pursuant to Congress’s taxing and spending powers” and did 
not necessarily have to show that a statute violated the Establish-
ment Clause.103 If it were actually proven that the conferences were 
used as promotional tools for religion, it was possible that the defen-
dants violated the Establishment Clause.104
 Judge Posner found that the difference between this case and 
Flast and Bowen revolved around the type of expenditures.105 The 
Freedom from Religion Foundation plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that 
the conferences were funded by expenditures from “appropriations,” 
or from Congress’s spending power, and that these appropriations 
were not earmarked for a specific purpose.106 Therefore, funding had 
to come from appropriations for the “general administrative ex-
penses.”107 The President, as well as other executive officials, had 
some discretion over the use of this money.108 In both Flast and Bo-
wen, the expenditures in question were “specific congressional grant 
programs,” while in the case at hand there was no actual “program,” 
just generally appropriated money given to the executive branch.109
 96. Id.
 97. Id.
 98. 487 U.S. 589 (1988).  
 99. Freedom from Religion Found., 433 F.3d at 993.  
 100. Bowen, 487 U.S. 589. 
 101. Id. at 593.
 102. Id. at 618-20.  
 103. Id.
 104. Id. at 623-24. 
 105. Freedom from Religion Found., 433 F.3d at 994.
 106. Id.
 107. Id.
 108. Id.
 109. Id.
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 However, Judge Posner did not believe this difference should be 
controlling.110 He gave two examples of opposite extremes: first, if the 
Secretary of Homeland Security used his general funds to build a 
mosque because he believed that giving financial assistance to Islam 
would reduce terrorism, taxpayer standing would not be essential to 
bringing suit—but it would be inconsistent to give taxpayers stand-
ing in cases that only “slightly” violated the Establishment Clause 
and not in cases where the violation was egregious.111 Second, if the 
President violated the Establishment Clause by positively referenc-
ing religion in his State of the Union address, a suit brought against 
him would not involve an expenditure of any kind.112 A taxpayer does 
not have standing to challenge executive branch actions that do not 
involve direct expenditures, even though almost all the activity of the 
executive branch is funded by general appropriations.113
 Judge Posner reasoned that as the conferences give instructions to 
religious organizations regarding how to apply for government 
grants, the challenge was to the promotional tool (or to the confer-
ences) and not the actual grants.114 He noted that the line the gov-
ernment wanted to draw between the initiative and grants made be-
cause of that initiative would be “artificial”; executive officials could 
still promote religion without giving outright grants.115 He further 
noted that the exception in Flast for “incidental” expenditures is rela-
tive.116 Going back to the mosque example, the building of a mosque 
would probably be “incidental” to the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity’s budget of $30 billion.117 “Incidental” does not necessarily mean 
the cost relative to the size of the budget—if it did, taxpayer standing 
would not exist.118
 Judge Posner also stated that taxpayers did not have standing to 
attack an executive action funded by expenditures that were not con-
sistent with congressional intent in allowing such expenditures.119
This would make the courts a manager over the executive branch—a 
job expressly reserved for Congress.120 He ultimately held that tax-
payers do have standing to attack executive actions financed gener-
ally by Congress if they are alleged to promote religion.121
 110. Id.
 111. Id. at 994-95.  
 112. Id. at 995.
 113. Id.
 114. Id.
 115. Id.
 116. Id.
 117. Id.
 118. Id.
 119. Id.
 120. Id.
 121. Id. at 997. 
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 Judge Ripple wrote a dissent expounding on his belief that prece-
dent did not allow “such a dramatic expansion of current standing 
doctrine” by allowing taxpayers to sue based on executive branch 
conduct as long as it was funded by a congressional appropria-
tion.122 Judge Ripple expressly noted that constitutional standing 
had become a “well-established doctrine” and that the Seventh 
Circuit, as an intermediate appellate court, could not change Su-
preme Court doctrine.123
 Judge Ripple focused his analysis on the concept of concrete in-
jury.124 He noted that standing was “rooted firmly” in Article III’s 
Case or Controversy Clause.125 The traditional test 
requires the party who invokes the court’s authority to show 
that he personally has suffered actual or threatened injury 
as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant, 
and that the injury can be traced to the challenged action 
and is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.126
This test should be construed rigorously, as noted in Flast v. 
Cohen.127 Taxpayers may challenge only congressional powers exer-
cised under the Taxing and Spending Clause, found in Article I.128
They must also show a “logical link” or nexus between these challenged 
congressional powers and taxpayer status129 and show a nexus between 
taxpayer status and the actual constitutional infringement.130
 Judge Ripple focused on the nexus between the taxpayers and the 
challenged congressional powers.131 Before doing so, he examined 
why the Supreme Court would want this connection to be examined 
so closely.132 Judge Ripple observed that taxpayer status has always 
stood on shaky ground in terms of constitutional standing, particu-
larly due to taxpayers bringing suits for undifferentiated injuries, or 
“mere disagreement[s] with the government policy.”133 The trend in 
the Supreme Court’s decisions indicated that many complaints were 
not really about the Taxing and Spending Clause, he declared, but 
other clauses such as the Account Clause, the Incompatibility 
 122. Id.
 123. Id.
 124. Id.
 125. Id.
 126. Id. (citing Valley Forge Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982)).  
 127. Id. (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102-103 (1968)).  
 128. Id.
 129. Id.
 130. Id.
 131. Id.
 132. Id.
 133. Id. at 997-98.  
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Clause, and the Property Clause.134 As a result, the Supreme Court 
denied each of these taxpayers standing.135 This case was based on 
the Establishment Clause, which does restrict Congress’s power to 
spend, but Judge Ripple decided the proper inquiry was whether it 
was based on the Taxing and Spending Clause.136
 Judge Ripple first analyzed Flast and its subsequent holdings re-
garding the subject.137 Taxpayer standing is merely a small exception 
to the prohibition of generalized grievances, and to allow taxpayers 
to challenge general government fund expenditures in addition to 
specific expenditures would significantly widen the exception.138 Tax-
payer standing exists only so expenditure and tax violations of the 
Establishment Clause may be remedied and because the Clause is so 
difficult to enforce.139 The Supreme Court has allowed standing for 
taxpayers to make “specific objections linked to a specific exercise of 
the taxing and spending power on the ground that it violates the Es-
tablishment Clause.”140 After Flast and subsequent cases, plaintiffs 
must challenge expenditures “made in the exercise of Congress’ tax-
ing and spending power” and directing attention to an executive 
branch program does not qualify.141
 Judge Ripple also looked at Bowen in his analysis.142 In Bowen,
the Court stated that the Adolescent Family Life Act was really a 
“disbursement of funds pursuant to Congress’ taxing and spending 
powers” and the fact that certain executive officials actually dis-
bursed the money did not matter.143 The Bowen Court interpreted the 
“touchstone” of Flast to be whether the executive official had author-
ity under the challenged statute to administer spending programs 
created by Congress.144 Judge Ripple disagreed with Judge Posner 
and Judge Wood that Bowen enlarged the concept of taxpayer stand-
ing by permitting plaintiffs to show that a general congressional ap-
propriations statute allowed executive branch officials to violate the 
Establishment Clause because it would allow any taxpayer to bring a 
 134. Id. at 998; see also Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of 
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982) (rejecting standing based on the Property 
Clause); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (rejecting 
standing based on the Incompatibility Clause); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 
(1974) (rejecting standing based on the Account Clause).  
 135. Freedom from Religion Found.¸ 433 F.3d at 998.  
 136. Id.
 137. Id.
 138. Id.
 139. Id.
 140. Id. at 998-99.  
 141. Id. at 1000. 
 142. Id.
 143. Id.
 144. Id.
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suit against any executive action.145 Judge Ripple felt that Bowen did 
not authorize the judiciary to question executive actions at the re-
quest of someone who cannot show a specific connection to the ac-
tion.146 He specifically noted that “[t]he executive can do nothing 
without general budget appropriations from Congress.”147
 Judge Ripple stated that the majority broadened the concept of 
taxpayer standing so that it could not be distinguished from the 
other forms of standing the Supreme Court has decided were “de-
structive of the case or controversy limitation on the power of the fed-
eral courts to intrude into the decision-making prerogatives of the 
executive branch.”148 He also noted that the decision brought the cir-
cuit out of line from the other circuits.149
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—FIRST AMENDMENT—A STUDENT’S RIGHT TO 
DISPLAY A BANNER AT AN EVENT DURING SCHOOL HOURS ACROSS THE 
STREET FROM THE SCHOOL—Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114 (9th 
Cir. 2006) 
 On March 19, 2007, the United States Supreme Court heard oral 
arguments for Frederick v. Morse,150 a First Amendment case origi-
nating out of the Ninth Circuit. The case involves the First Amend-
ment rights of Joseph Frederick, then a high school senior at Juneau-
Douglas High School in Juneau, Alaska.151 The Supreme Court 
granted writ of certiorari for the case on March 5, 2007.152 Famed 
Clinton-era former independent counsel Kenneth Starr argued the 
case on behalf of Principal Deborah Morse, whom the Ninth Circuit 
determined could be personally liable to Frederick for her actions.153
The Supreme Court’s decision may have far-reaching consequences 
for both the First Amendment rights of students and the ability of 
school administrators to punish unwanted speech. This Note will 
fully explore the Ninth Circuit’s decision. 
 One January day the Olympic Torch was scheduled to pass the 
Juneau-Douglas High School (High School).154 The High School let 
students out of classes to watch the torch pass.155 The event, called 
the “Winter Olympics Torch Relay,” was sponsored by various com-
 145. Id.
 146. Id.
 147. Id.
 148. Id.
 149. Id. at 1000-01.  
 150. 439 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 151. Id. at 1115. 
 152. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 722 (2007). 
 153. CNN, Justices Hear ‘Bong Hits for Jesus’ Case (Mar. 19, 2007), available at
http://www.cnn.com/2007/LAW/03/19/scotus.bonghits.ap/index.html. 
 154. Frederick, 39 F.3d at 1115. 
 155. Id.
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panies, including Coca-Cola.156 Frederick arrived at school late be-
cause he was stuck in the snow, which meant he showed only in time 
to come to the event.157 Frederick met with some friends on the side-
walk across from the High School.158 Frederick waited until TV cam-
eras were within range and then displayed a banner that read “Bong 
Hits for Jesus.”159 Various fights and other roughhousing amongst 
the students occurred before Frederick unveiled the banner.160 Prin-
cipal Morse saw the banner, crossed the street, took the banner from 
him, and crumpled it up.161 Immediately before Morse took the ban-
ner, Frederick “asked ‘What about the Bill of Rights and freedom of 
speech?’ ”162 Morse responded that “she ‘felt that it violated the policy 
against displaying offensive material, including material that adver-
tises or promotes use of illegal drugs.’ ”163 Frederick was suspended 
for ten days, and he unsuccessfully appealed his suspension.164 Fre-
derick then filed a § 1983 complaint in federal court, claiming his 
First Amendment rights had been violated.165 The district court 
granted summary judgment for Morse, holding that no constitu-
tional right had been violated and that if one had been violated, 
Morse had qualified immunity.166 Frederick then filed his appeal 
with the Ninth Circuit.167
 The Ninth Circuit first answered whether this should be a school 
case at all, as an amicus brief had argued that as Frederick was on a 
public sidewalk and not in school, his case should be treated as 
such.168 However, without much discussion, the Ninth Circuit de-
termined that this was a school case because school was in session 
and the High School did maintain supervision over the students to 
some extent.169
 After concluding that this was a school speech case, the court 
noted that 
[t]he school principal and school board [did] not claim that 
the display disrupted or was expected to disrupt any class-
room work. They concede[d] that their objection to the dis-
play, and the reason why the principal ripped down the ban-
 156. Id.
 157. Id.
 158. Id.
 159. Id.
 160. Id. at 1115-16. 
 161. Id. at 1115. 
 162. Id. at 1116. 
 163. Id.
 164. Id. at 1115. 
 165. Id. at 1115-17. 
 166. Id. at 1116-17. 
 167. Id. at 1115. 
 168. Id. at 1117. 
 169. Id.
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ner, was not concern that it would cause disruption but that 
its message would be understood as advocating or promoting 
illegal drug use.170
Although Frederick maintained that the message was not advocating 
illegal drug use and was instead just a nonsensical phrase, the court 
conducted its analysis assuming that the message expressed positive 
sentiments towards illegal drug use.171
 With the above concessions and facts in mind, the Ninth Circuit 
proceeded to analyze the First Amendment claim, framing the issue 
in the following way: “whether a school may, in the absence of con-
cern about disruption of educational activities, punish and censor 
non-disruptive, off-campus speech by students during school-
authorized activities because the speech promotes a social message 
contrary to the one favored by the school.”172
.
 The underlying legal is-
sue that decided the case was how the court chose to categorize the 
speech, or more specifically, what case law the court believed was 
applicable. The Ninth Circuit believed this to be a Tinker v. Des 
Moines Independent Community School District173
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser
 case, while Morse 
argued it was either a 174 or 
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier175 case
 In Tinker, students wore black arm bands to protest the war.176
“Tinker held that ‘the prohibition of expression of one particular 
opinion, at least without evidence that it is necessary to avoid mate-
rial and substantial interference with schoolwork or discipline, is not 
constitutionally permissible.’ ”177
 In Fraser, a student was punished after giving a speech for a can-
didate for student office.178 The speech, heavily laden with sexual in-
nuendo, was given at a school assembly, and disruption immediately 
ensued.179 The court believed that “Fraser focuses upon the sexual 
nature of the offensiveness in the in-school speech that can be pun-
ished, as contrasted with the ‘political viewpoint’ of the speech pro-
tected in Tinker.”180 Furthermore, Fraser protects the school’s ability 
to protect its basic educational mission.181
 170. Id.
 171. Id. at 1117-18. 
 172. Id. at 1118. 
 173. 89 S. Ct. 733 (1969). 
 174. 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986). 
 175. 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988). 
 176. Frederick, 39 F.3d at 1118. 
 177. Id. (quoting Tinker, 89 S. Ct. at 740). 
 178. Id. at 1119. 
 179. Id.
 180. Id.
 181. Id. at 1120. 
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 In Kuhlmeier, a school-run newspaper attempted to publish an ar-
ticle that dealt with pregnancy and divorce.182 Because the newspa-
per was run by the school and was part of the school curriculum, 
the newspaper’s speech was an affirmative promotion by the 
school of the student author’s speech, a promotion the First 
Amendment does not require.183
 The Ninth Circuit believed this case to be a Tinker case.184 The 
School Board, which was also a defendant, had argued that punish-
ment was consistent with enforcing the High School’s mission in op-
posing illegal drug use.185 The student in Tinker was opposing a war, 
which, according to the Ninth Circuit, was opposition to the most im-
portant governmental mission, winning a war.186 Tinker allows cen-
sorship or punishment towards student speech only when the school 
can “show a reasonable concern about the likelihood of substantial 
disruption to its educational mission.”187
 The court believed that Fraser did not apply for several reasons.188
First, Fraser focused on the “sexual nature” of the speech, which was 
“plainly offensive” and caused disruption of a school assembly.189 On 
the other hand, Frederick’s speech was not sexual in nature and did 
not disrupt a school assembly.190 Not only was Frederick’s speech not 
“plainly offensive,” but in a state where legalizing marijuana is often 
at issue, it very well could have been political speech in the same 
vein as Tinker.191 Additionally, Tinker does not allow a school to de-
fine its mission in any way it sees fit and then punish students who 
oppose this mission.192 Instead, Fraser adds to Tinker the notion that 
schools can punish speech that disrupts its educational function, 
which did not occur in this case.193
 The court distinguished Kuhlmeier in an even quicker fashion, 
reasoning that Frederick’s banner “was not sponsored or endorsed by 
the school, nor was it part of the curriculum, nor did it take place as 
part of an official school activity.”194 The court thought that Kuhl-
 182. Id. at 1119. 
 183. Id.
 184. Id. at 1118. 
 185. Id. at 1119. 
 186. Id.
 187. Id. at 1123. 
 188. Id. at 1119. 
 189. Id.
 190. Id.
 191. Id.
 192. Id. at 1120 (citing various examples where a school’s mission could not interfere 
with legitimate First Amendment rights, such as a school’s anti-alcohol message being un-
dermined by a student e-mailing medical reports to other students showing the health 
benefits of alcohol). 
 193. Id.
 194. Id. at 1119. 
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meier may have applied had Frederick insisted on creating the ban-
ner in a school art class; however, that was not the case.195
 The School Board and Morse pointed to Boroff v. Van Wert City 
Board of Education,196 a Sixth Circuit case that upheld a school dress 
code that prohibited wearing Marilyn Manson T-shirts, some of 
which contained pro-drug and anti-religious messages.197 The Sixth 
Circuit read Fraser in a way that gave wide discretion to schools to 
determine the appropriateness of messages at school, concluding that 
the T-shirts could be banned because they were contrary to the 
school’s educational mission.198 The Frederick court declined to follow 
Boroff to the extent that Boroff implies that a school can regulate 
speech “as ‘plainly offensive’ whenever it conflicts with a vaguely-
defined ‘educational mission.’ ”199 The Frederick court further be-
lieved that Fraser did not give schools the right to prohibit any 
speech that is “offensive,” meaning that “offensive” speech did not 
automatically switch the analysis from Tinker to Fraser.200 By the 
School Board’s and Morse’s standard, the High School could prohibit 
Frederick from distributing copies of an Alaskan Supreme Court de-
cision upholding the right to possession of marijuana, when the case 
was distributed across the street from the school.201 Instead, “Fraser
only enables schools to prevent the sort of vulgar, obscene, lewd, or 
sexual speech that, especially with adolescents, readily promotes dis-
ruption and diversion from the educational curriculum.”202
 After determining that this case was properly decided under 
Tinker, the court determined that because Morse punished the 
speech not to stop disruption of its educational mission but because 
the speech disrupted the High School’s anti-drug message, the pun-
ishment failed the Tinker test and thus violated Frederick’s First 
Amendment rights.203
 As previously noted, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision will likely 
have far-reaching consequences for both students and school officials. 
Although this Note does not offer a prediction as to the outcome, the 
holding will likely hinge on whether the Court decides to follow the 
Sixth Circuit’s or the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Fraser. It 
seems likely that the conservatives on the Court will side with the 
 195. Id. at 1119-20.  
 196. 220 F.3d 465 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 197. Frederick, 39 F.3d at 1122. 
 198. Id.
 199. Id.
 200. Id.
 201. Id.
 202. Id.
 203. Id. at 1123. The court also went on to determine that the defendants did not have 
qualified immunity and could be subject to money damages because Frederick’s rights 
were clearly established under the applicable precedent. Id. at 1123-25. 
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Sixth Circuit and hold that Fraser gives wide discretion to schools to 
determine its educational mission, while the liberals on the Court 
will likely side with the Frederick court and hold that Fraser is lim-
ited to sexual speech that causes a real disruption to the school’s ba-
sic educational mission. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—THE POLICE DO NOT HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE 
TO ARREST A CITIZEN UNDER A STATUTE THAT HASN’T BEEN RULED 
UNCONSITUTIONAL, IF THE STATUTE ON ITS FACE WOULD BE
CONSTRUED UNCONSTITUTIONAL BY A REASONABLE PERSON—Leonard 
v. Robinson, 477 F.3d 347 (6th Cir. 2007) 
 Thomas Leonard appealed the summary judgment granted to the 
defendant, police officer Stephen Robinson, by the federal district 
court in a civil rights action resulting from Leonard’s arrest at a 
township board meeting.204 The district court dismissed the wrongful 
arrest civil case against Robinson, holding that he was protected by 
qualified immunity and that Leonard “could not make out a prima 
facie case” on his claim that his First Amendment rights were vio-
lated by an improper motive of the officer.205 On appeal, the Sixth 
Circuit reversed the lower court’s ruling, stating that it overlooked 
the application of the First Amendment to the state statute used to 
charge Leonard and ignored evidence which may have shown that 
Robinson had an improper motive.206 The court of appeals held that 
“no reasonable officer would have found probable cause to arrest 
Leonard solely for uttering ‘God damn’ while addressing the town-
ship board,” as this type of debate is clearly protected by the First 
Amendment.207 The court additionally held that Leonard’s retaliation 
claim survived summary judgment, as the motive for the arrest was 
a genuine issue of material fact that should be heard by a jury.208
 Leonard’s wife, Sara, operated a towing company, Auto Works, in 
Montrose, Michigan, until 2000.209 Around that time, the Montrose 
police chief, Chief Abraham, was in the process of trying to extend 
the jurisdiction of the police force.210 Sarah’s mother was a member of 
the city council that heard the proposal brought by the police chief, 
and she opposed the plan.211 “Abraham asked Sarah to lobby her 
mother in support of the plan. In return, he offered [that] Auto 
Works could continue to tow for the Township. When Sarah refused, 
 204. Leonard v. Robinson, 477 F.3d 347, 351 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 205. Id.
 206. Id.
 207. Id.
 208. Id.
 209. Id.
 210. Id.
 211. Id.
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Auto Works lost its business with the Township.”212 Sarah sued the 
town and Abraham for violating her First Amendment rights, and a 
settlement was later reached; however, before the settlement was 
reached Leonard and his wife attended a Township Board meeting.213
Also at this meeting was Officer Robinson, who testified that Abra-
ham ordered him to attend the meeting.214 Leonard believed Abra-
ham sent Robinson so that if given the chance, he would arrest Sarah 
in retaliation for the suit against Abraham.215 “As a result of the law-
suit, according to Leonard, Chief Abraham hated him and his 
wife.”216 At the meeting, Robinson was asked by another attendee 
why he was at the meeting and lied by stating that “I’d like to see 
what’s going on.”217
 At the meeting, during a portion known as “citizen time,” Leonard 
was given the opportunity to speak, and he began by saying that he 
and his wife were being treated unfairly by the town.218 A short con-
versation between Leonard and a board member followed, and before 
it ended Leonard used the phrase “God damn” and then sat down; he 
was then told by the board member to not use God’s name in vain.219
Leonard responded to this statement by telling the board member 
that he could do whatever he wanted, and then he was interrupted 
by Robinson.220 Leonard told Robinson to leave him alone, and Rob-
inson replied that he was going to take Leonard with him.221 Robin-
son then took Leonard outside and placed him under arrest.222
 Leonard was charged with violating of Michigan laws applying to 
disorderly persons and obscenity, but one month later the citation 
was voided.223 Leonard later filed suit against Officer Robinson in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, “al-
leging that Robinson, under color of law, violated his Fourth Amend-
ment right to be free of unreasonable seizure. The complaint also 
raised three state law torts: battery, false arrest, and false impris-
onment.”224 Robinson moved for summary judgment, asserting that 
he was protected by qualified immunity on the constitutional claims 
and that the state law claims should be dismissed because the arrest 
 212. Id.
 213. Id.
 214. Id.
 215. Id.
 216. Id.
 217. Id. at 352. 
 218. Id.
 219. Id.
 220. Id.
 221. Id.
 222. Id.
 223. Id.
 224. Id.
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was supported by probable cause.225 Leonard responded by defending 
his claims on a First Amendment retaliation theory.226 The district 
court ruled in favor of Robinson, granting summary judgment.227
 The Sixth Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de
novo, as the main issues in the case were questions of law.228 The 
overriding issue addressed by the court was the 
question of whether an arrest for obscenity, vulgarity, or dis-
turbing the peace, when based upon speech and not conduct, 
is valid when it occurs during a democratic assembly 
where there is no evidence that the individual arrested 
was out of order and some evidence of improper motive by 
the arresting officer.229
 The court first examined whether Robinson’s defense of qualified 
immunity protected him from civil liability.230 The court’s analysis 
continued with a review of whether Robinson had probable cause un-
der state law to arrest Leonard.231 The court stated that qualified 
immunity protects public officials from civil liability unless their 
conduct violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional 
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”232 The court 
noted that, viewing the issue in the light most favorable to the in-
jured party, it must determine whether a constitutional right was 
 225. Id. In his motion for summary judgment, to show probable cause for the arrest, 
Robinson claimed there were four statutes that Leonard violated: Michigan Compiled Laws 
sections 750.103 (cursing and swearing), 750.170 (disturbance of lawful meetings), 750.167 
(disorderly person), and 750.337 (obscenity). 
 226. Leonard, 477 F.3d at 352. 
 227. Id. at 353.  
The district court held that Robinson did not violate the Fourth Amendment be-
cause he had probable cause to arrest Leonard. The court declined to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. . . . 
  The district court denied Leonard’s First Amendment retaliation claim by 
holding that there was no “causal connection between Plaintiff’s protected 
speech and his arrest.” . . . The court refused to make reasonable inferences fa-
vorable to Leonard’s claims. Instead, it ignored his allegations regarding Robin-
son’s motive for the arrest, the previous lawsuit by Leonard’s wife, and Robin-
son’s inconsistent statements and held that “there is absolutely no evidence of 
any improper motive.” The district court concluded that it was illegal to “use [ ]  
objectionable language and become [ ]  somewhat belligerent during a public 
meeting,” and that Leonard should have just calmed down and not made a fed-
eral case of it. 
Id. (internal citations omitted) (alterations in original). 
 228. Id.
 229. Id. at 351. The facts of what happened were to be construed in the light most fa-
vorable to Leonard. Id.
 230. Id. at 354. 
 231. Id. at 355. 
 232. Id. at 354 (quoting Estate of Carter v. Detroit, 408 F.3d 305, 310-11 (6th Cir. 
2005) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982))). 
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violated and whether that right is clearly established.233 “For a right 
to be clearly established, the ‘contours of the right must be suffi-
ciently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what 
he is doing violates that right.’ ”234
 The court held that Robinson inhibited First Amendment free-
doms that have been clearly established for a generation, thus pre-
cluding “a finding of probable cause because the laws cited by Robin-
son are either facially invalid, vague, or overbroad when applied to 
speech (as opposed to conduct) at a democratic assembly where the 
speaker is not out of order.”235 The court further noted that the facts 
of the case represented the universally perceived First Amendment 
protection of the free discussion of governmental affairs.236 The First 
Amendment reflects “a profound national commitment to the princi-
ple that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and 
wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and 
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public of-
ficials.”237 The court declared that even the narrowest interpretation 
of the rights protected under freedom of speech would include the 
holding that one should refrain from interrupting or regulating 
speech in a democratic forum such as a town meeting.238
 The court then looked at the four sections of Michigan’s Penal 
Code that Robinson claimed gave him probable cause for the ar-
rest.239 The first statute that Leonard was accused of violating was 
section 750.337, Michigan Compiled Laws, “regulating speech in the 
presence of women or children.”240 The court held that Leonard’s vio-
 233. Id. (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)); see also Groh v. Ramirez, 
540 U.S. 551, 563-64 (2004) (noting that reasonable public officials should know the law 
governing their conduct). 
 234. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). “For a plaintiff to 
state a claim for First Amendment retaliation, he must show that the injury was material, 
‘that his conduct was constitutionally protected,’ and that it was a ‘motivating factor’ be-
hind the government’s actions.” Id. at 355 (quoting Adair v. Charter County of Wayne, 452 
F.3d 482, 492 (6th Cir. 2006)) (internal citation omitted). 
 235. Id. at 356. 
 236. Id. (“The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end 
that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be ob-
tained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fun-
damental principle of our constitutional system.” (quoting Stromberg v. California, 283 
U.S. 359, 369 (1931))).  
 237. Id. (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). 
 238. Id. The court noted the long-standing precedent of courts finding that constitu-
tional protection should be accorded only to speech that is explicitly political and that even 
if speech is political, there may be a few exceptions when it may be limited, such as when it 
entails the use of fighting words or when the social interest outweighs the right of free 
speech. Id.
 239. Id.
 240. Id. (This law stated that “[a]ny person who shall use any indecent, immoral, ob-
scene, vulgar or insulting language in the presence or hearing of any woman or child shall 
be guilty of a misdemeanor.”). 
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lation of this law did not create probable cause, as this law had been 
ruled unconstitutional in prior decisions.241 The court explained how 
this law had been determined to be constitutionally vague, as it dele-
gated “basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for reso-
lution on an ad hoc and subjective basis [and created the danger of] 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”242 The court opined that 
it would be hard to envision a more vague statute than the one before 
it and that the language within the statute outlawing “insulting lan-
guage” would subject many people to the threat of misdemeanor 
prosecution without knowledge of what constituted a violation.243
 The court noted that the constitutionality of the other three stat-
utes relied upon by Robinson had not been as “clearly or directly” ex-
amined by Michigan courts as had section 750.337.244 Adding that a 
police officer’s duty is to enforce laws “until and unless they are de-
clared unconstitutional,”245 the court further stated that the passing 
of a law by the legislature eliminates the need for speculation by the 
police as to whether the statute is constitutional except when the law 
is so clearly and blatantly unconstitutional that any reasonable per-
son would be hard pressed to not see the flaws.246 The court ex-
plained that when looking at the facts “in the light most favorable to 
the plaintiff, no reasonable police officer would believe that any of 
the three other Michigan statutes relied upon by the district court 
are constitutional as applied to Leonard’s political speech during a 
democratic assembly.”247
 The court then discussed why the other three statutes could not 
support probable cause as applied to Leonard’s speech.248 Section 
750.167 defines “disorderly person,” in part, as “[a] person who is en-
gaged in indecent or obscene conduct in a public place.”249 The court 
explained that the plain language of the statute regulates conduct 
and not speech; the statute reads as regulating indecent conduct 
such as the exposing of one’s body parts. Even if speech was not 
meant to be regulated by this statute, however, the statute would be 
 241. Id. at 358. 
 242. Id. The court explained that “in order to pass constitutional muster, a penal stat-
ute must define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can 
understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary 
and discriminatory enforcement.” Id. (quoting People v. Boomer, 655 N.W.2d 255, 258 
(Mich. Ct. App. 2002)). 
 243. Id.
 244. Id. at 358-59. 
 245. Id. at 359. 
 246. Id. (“Society would be ill-served if its police officers took it upon themselves to de-
termine which laws are and which are not constitutionally entitled to enforcement.”).  
 247. Id.
 248. Id.
 249. Id. at 356. 
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similar to section 750.337, which as noted before has been ruled to be 
flagrantly unconstitutional.250
 The court further explained that Leonard’s conduct could not be 
punished under section 750.103, which makes “profanely curs[ing] or 
damn[ing] or swear[ing] by the name of God, Jesus Christ or the 
Holy Ghost a crime.”251 The court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court 
ruled in Cohen v. California252 that a state may not make the use of a 
“single four letter expletive” a crime and that there is no distinction 
between the facts in Cohen and the ones found in this case.253 The 
court also noted that the use of the phrase “God damn” by Leonard 
during his political speech did not fall under the category of fight-
ing words. Thus, the court held, barring Leonard from using the 
expletive in his display of political speech during a town meeting 
was unconstitutional.254
 The last statute the court examined was section 750.103, prohibit-
ing “[a]ny person [from making or exciting] any disturbance or con-
tention . . . at any . . . public meeting where citizens are peaceably 
and lawfully assembled.”255 The court noted that this statute had al-
ready been ruled to be overbroad by the Michigan Court of Appeals, 
which held that the phrase “excite any contention” must be stricken 
from the statute for the law to be constitutional,256 adding that there 
was no conduct exhibited by Leonard that would be prohibited under 
this statute.257
 After elaborating on why there was no probable cause for Leo-
nard’s arrest under Michigan statutes, the court explained why it 
disagreed with the dissent’s statement that, as the record contained 
a video of the incident, certain facts were undisputed.258 The judge 
writing for the majority stated that he viewed the video and came to 
a different conclusion personally, but, more importantly, believed 
that a rational juror may come up with a different conclusion.259 The 
majority concluded that this “judgment means that there is a genu-
ine issue of material fact as to whether Leonard’s conduct could con-
 250. Id. at 359. 
 251. Id.
252. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
 253. Id. (quoting Cohen, 403 U.S. at 16 (where “the defendant was observed in the Los 
Angeles County Courthouse . . . wearing a jacket bearing the words ‘Fuck the Draft’ ”)). 
 254. Id. at 359-60. 
 255. Id. at 360. 
 256. Id. (citing People v. Purifoy, 191 N.W.2d 63 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971) (finding that the 
statute was meant to deal with intentional acts of violence and holding that for someone to 
be punished under this statute, the activity must be shown to present a threat to public 
welfare)). 
 257. Id.
 258. Id. at 361. 
 259. Id.
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stitutionally be considered criminal by any rational officer.”260 Before 
looking at the retaliation claim, the majority stated that the facts in 
this case could lead a reasonable fact finder to conclude that Leonard 
did not disrupt the peace.261 The court therefore held 
that no reasonable officer would [have found] that probable 
cause exist[ed] to arrest a recognized speaker at a chaired 
public assembly based solely on the content of his speech (al-
beit vigorous or blasphemous) unless and until the speaker 
[was] determined to be out of order by the individual chair-
ing the assembly.262
 The court finished its opinion by discussing why the district 
court’s analysis of the retaliation claim was also flawed.263 The court 
noted that the district court never considered whether Leonard’s 
speech at the town meeting was protected and that the lower court 
wrongly assumed that all the statutes listed by Robinson were valid, 
as no court had specifically struck them down.264 The court also noted 
that the district court failed to look at the evidence relevant to Leo-
nard’s claim that Robinson had a motive in making the arrest.265 The 
dispute between the police chief and the Leonard family and that an-
other attendee stated that the officer lied about why he was attend-
ing the meeting, along with a lawsuit being filed before the town 
meeting, was evidence that Leonard may have been arrested in re-
taliation for constitutionally protected conduct.266 The court con-
cluded by holding “that Leonard . . . set out a prima facie case of 
First Amendment retaliation and . . . created a genuine issue of 
material fact.”267
 The dissenting judge felt that Robinson had probable cause to ar-
rest Leonard, reasoning that while he believed the four statutes used 
as support for the arrest may indeed be unconstitutional, he was “not 
prepared to accept [the majority’s] judgment that the Supreme 
Court, our court or the Michigan courts [have] clearly established the 
unconstitutionality of all four of [the] duly enacted laws before this 
incident.”268 The dissent further stated that although section 750.337 
had been ruled unconstitutional, he was not ready to find that the 
other three statutes would be found by a reasonable person to have 
been ruled unconstitutional by the courts.269 For example, the dissent 
 260. Id.
 261. Id.
 262. Id.
 263. Id. at 361-62. 
 264. Id. at 362. 
 265. Id.
 266. Id.
 267. Id. at 363. 
 268. Id.
 269. Id.
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noted, section 750.170 (“Disturbance of lawful meetings”) had with-
stood several constitutional challenges, including one in the past 
couple of decades, and even if Robinson had looked the statute up be-
fore arriving at the meeting, he would not have reasonably known 
that it was “clearly established” that he should not enforce it in this 
type of setting.270 The dissent reasoned that as “the Supreme Court 
[and the majority of other district courts have] never rejected a claim 
of qualified immunity to a police officer who enforced a statute that 
had not been declared unconstitutional at the time of the citizen-
police encounter,” the three statutes which had not been directly 
found to be in violation of the constitution were enough to grant 
probable cause for the arrest.271 The dissent further stated that “[t]he 
First Amendment properly protected Leonard from being prose-
cuted for his unruly speech and conduct—and for now that is 
enough[, and that to] expose Robinson to money damages for enforc-
ing these laws . . . seems unfair.”272 The dissenting judge concluded 
by stating that he believed the retaliation claim was moot as well, as 
there was probable cause; even if there weren’t probable cause, Rob-
inson had done nothing more than try to restore order to a meeting 
that was getting out of hand, and Leonard had failed to show any 
concrete evidence that the police were out to get him.273
HABEAS CORPUS—CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF ALIENS—Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld (Hamdan 2), 464 F.Supp.2d 9 (D.D.C. 2006) 
 On the heels of the complex, controversial opinion from the United 
States Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 1,274 the District 
Court for the District of Columbia, Judge Robertson, again faced the 
difficult questions encircling military commissions, enemy combat-
ants, and the jurisdiction of federal courts. Quite familiar by now 
with the facts in Hamdan, Judge Robertson recalled: 
Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a Yemeni national, was taken into United 
States military custody in Afghanistan in November 2001. He was 
transported to the Defense Department’s detention facility at 
 270. Id. at 364. 
 271. Id. at 365. 
The dissenting judge reasoned that “Leonard not only asks . . . to take a road 
less traveled but one never traveled. It is one thing to credit police officers with 
knowledge of all statutory and constitutional rulings potentially bearing on all 
statutes they enforce; but this necessary requirement needlessly loses any con-
nection with reality when we hold police officers to the standard of anticipating 
a court’s later invalidation of a statute that was duly enacted by legislators sworn 
to uphold the Constitution, that is presumed constitutional, that has been on the 
books for 75 years and that has withstood two constitutional challenges.” 
Id. at 367. 
 272. Id.
 273. Id.
 274. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (Hamdan 1), 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). 
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Guantanamo Bay in June 2002. In July 2003, the President de-
clared him eligible for trial by military commission. On April 6, 
2004, Hamdan petitioned for mandamus or habeas corpus in the 
United States District Court for the Western District of Washing-
ton. On July 13, 2004, after having been held for about two years 
and eight months without formal charges, Hamdan was finally 
charged at Guantanamo Bay with a single count of conspiracy. In 
August 2004, his habeas petition was transferred to this court. 
On November 8, 2004, I granted Hamdan’s petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus  after finding that he could not be tried lawfully be-
fore a military commission that had not been approved by Con-
gress, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F.Supp.2d 152 (D.D.C.2004). That 
decision was reversed by a panel of the D.C. Circuit on July 15, 
2005, 415 F.3d 33, in a decision that was itself reversed a year 
later by the Supreme Court, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, [], 126 S.Ct. 
2749, [] (2006), four justices noting that “[n]othing prevents the 
President from returning to Congress to seek the authority he be-
lieves necessary” to lawfully try enemy combatants, Id. at 2799, 
(Breyer, J., concurring). On September 22, 2006, the Court of Ap-
peals remanded the case to me “for further proceedings.” The re-
mand order contained no instructions, nor was it clear what pro-
ceedings, if any, would be possible –for, by that time, the President 
had indeed “return[ed] to Congress,” and he had asked Congress to 
strip the federal courts of their jurisdiction to hear any habeas pe-
titions of the Guantanamo detainees. 
On September 29, 2006 Congress enacted, and . . . the President 
signed, the Military Commissions Act . . . which amends the fed-
eral habeas statute by removing jurisdiction of any ‘court, judge, or 
justice’ over habeas petitions and all other actions filed by aliens 
who are either detained as enemy combatants or are ‘awaiting 
such determination.’ [“The day after the MCA became law, the 
government filed, in each of the 181 Guantanamo habeas cases 
pending in this Court, a Notice of Military Commissions Act of 
2006 [seeking dismissal], highlighting the jurisdiction-stripping 
and retroactivity provisions of the Act.”]275
 After recounting the facts, the district court construed Hamdan’s 
claim as presenting three fundamental questions: (1) did the Military 
Commissions Act successfully remove statutory habeas jurisdiction 
over detainees like Hamdan; (2) if it did, is the Act constitutionally 
valid as a suspension276 of the writ of habeas corpus; and (3) does 
Hamdan have a constitutional writ of habeas corpus that survives 
the Act?277
 275. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (Hamdan 2), 464 F. Supp. 2d 9, 10-11 (D.D.C. 2006) (inter-
nal citations omitted). 
 276. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (the Suspension Clause). 
 277. Hamdan 2, 464 F. Supp. 2d at 11. 
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 First, the district court concluded that the Military Commissions 
Act clearly intended to remove statutory habeas jurisdiction for de-
tainees such as Hamdan. Although the standard for such clarity is 
high—“Congress must articulate specific and unambiguous statutory 
directives to effect a repeal [of jurisdiction]”278—section 7(a) and (b) of 
the Military Commissions Act provided such unambiguous direc-
tives.279 Because the language of the Act was “so clear that it could 
sustain only one interpretation”280—and that interpretation was that 
no statutory jurisdiction remained for Hamdan—the court concluded 
the Act had foreclosed statutory habeas.281
 Next the court turned to the second question: whether the Mili-
tary Commissions Act was a valid suspension of the writ of habeas 
corpus. After tracing the history of the Great Writ from the four-
teenth century to the present as “a guardian of liberty,”282 the court 
turned to the language and jurisprudence of the Suspension 
Clause.283 “Although [the Suspension Clause] does not state that sus-
pension must be effected by, or authorized by, a legislative act, it has 
been so understood, consistent with English practice and the 
Clause’s placement in Article I.”284 In fact, Congress has authorized 
executive suspension of the writ of habeas corpus only four times in 
 278. Id. (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299 (2001)). 
 279. Id. at 11-12. Section 7 of the Act states: 
 a) IN GENERAL.-Section 2241 of title 28, United States Code [the habeas 
statute], is amended by . . . 
inserting the following new subsection (e): 
 (e)(1) No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an 
application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained 
by the United States who has been determined by the United States to have been 
properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination. 
 (2) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 1005(e) of the De-
tainee Treatment Act of 2005 (10 U.S.C. 801 note), no court, justice, or judge 
shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider any other action against the United 
States or its agents relating to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, 
trial, or conditions of confinement of an alien who is or was detained by the 
United States and has been determined by the United States to have been 
properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination. 
  (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.-The amendment made by subsection (a) shall 
take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act, and shall apply to all 
cases, without exception, pending on or after the date of the enactment of 
this Act which relate to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, 
trial, or conditions of detention of an alien detained by the United States 
since September 11, 2001. 
Hamdan 2, 464 F. Supp. 2d at 11-12.
 280. Hamdan 2, 464 F. Supp. 2d at 12 (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 329 n.4 
(1997)). 
 281. Id.
 282. Id. at 13. 
 283. Id. at 14. The Suspension Clause states: “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Cor-
pus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public 
Safety may require it.” Id. (quoting Article I, section 9, clause 2). 
 284. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 562 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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its history, and each such suspension “occurred during times of in-
disputable, and congressionally declared, rebellion or invasion.”285
Though noting that there are aspects of the Suspension Clause that 
are still somewhat open questions,286 the court concluded that the 
protection of the writ is “absolute in the absence of ‘invasion’ or ‘re-
bellion.’ Neither . . . was occurring at the time the MCA was en-
acted.”287 As Congress “made no findings of the predicate conditions 
[of invasion or rebellion], as it did [in each of the prior four suspen-
sions of the writ,]”288 the court concluded that “Congress itself must 
not have thought that it was ‘suspending’ the writ with the enact-
ment of the MCA.”289 Thus, the Great Writ survived the Military 
Commissions Act and, “to the extent [it] operates to make the writ 
unavailable to a person who is constitutionally entitled to it, it must 
be unconstitutional.”290
 Finally, the court turned to the third question: is Hamdan entitled 
to the constitutional writ that survives the Act? To answer this ques-
tion, the court had to determine whether the Great Writ was avail-
able to an alien in the factual contours of Hamdan’s detention. Look-
ing to past cases, the court held that habeas had been granted only to 
an alien that had “a significant relationship to the country in which 
the writ was sought.”291 The court also noted that no prior, applicable 
cases had held an alien “captured abroad and detained outside the 
United States—or in [territory the U.S. controls]—had a . . . constitu-
tionally protected right to the writ of habeas corpus.”292 Because 
Hamdan did not reside “lawfully or unlawfully on American soil”293
nor did he “become a part of the population enough to separate him-
self from the common law tradition generally barring non-resident 
enemy aliens from accessing courts in wartime,” Hamdan was not 
entitled to the Great Writ.294 The court summed up the third ques-
tion by stating that “Hamdan’s lengthy detention beyond American 
borders but within the jurisdictional authority of the United States is 
historically unique[, but n]evertheless . . . his connection to the 
United States lacks the geographical and volitional predicates neces-
sary to claim a constitutional right to habeas corpus.”295 So, while the 
285. Hamdan 2, 464 F. Supp. 2d at 14, 15. 
 286. “The Supreme Court has never decided whether an Act of Congress alone has ef-
fectively ‘suspended’ the writ. . . . [I]ndeed, the Court has carefully avoided saying exactly 
what the Suspension Clause protects.” Id. at 15. 
 287. Id. at 16. 
 288. Id.
 289. Id.
 290. Id.
 291. Id. at 17. 
 292. Id. (quoting Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 475 (2004)). 
 293. Id.
 294. Id. (relying in part on Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950)). 
 295. Id. at 18. 
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Military Commissions Act had not suspended the Great Writ, it had 
modified statutory habeas jurisdiction, and therefore Hamdan’s only 
access to habeas corpus, and thus to the District Court, would come 
through the Constitution. Here, his “lawful but involuntary [pres-
ence] is not the sort to indicate any substantial connections with our 
country that would justify the invocation of a constitutional right to 
habeas corpus.”296 Thus, Hamdan was denied access to federal court. 
 Although Hamdan was denied habeas corpus access to federal 
court, given the highly pertinent legal issues involved, this is likely 
just the beginning of another round of appeals—a round that may 
well again find its way to the Supreme Court. 
 296. Id. (citation omitted). 
